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I. I have taken the title of this paper very seriously and consequently
I am going to attempt to focus the analysis specifically on race as a factor in 
politics, as opposed to culture, ethnicity, class or any other aspect of 
social difference. This is difficult because race seldom exists in isolation 
from other differences such as those I have mentioned. It is also difficult 
because race is a curiously subtle and elusive factor in politics, as I will 
try to show. For these two reasons I will have to commence the argument 
with a number of very obvious points and arguments, simply in order to try to 
give my later remarks some firm basis. I apologise in advance for any tedium.
One other apology needs to be made. Although the title may sound 
prescriptive, my final remarks will be merely suggestive. I agree fully 
with Gabriel Almond and Robert Mundt when they say that "choices in politics 
are constrained but indeterminate".^ Sociology and political science seldom 
provide political route-maps; they can only indicate dead-ends, dangerous 
curves and the condition of roads. Politicians and their supporters and 
ideologues must choose the destinations.
Intrinsically or in itselfs race as a factor in the political dynamics 
of a society means virtually nothing. Here one thinks of race simply as a 
clustering of biological characteristics. Why should nose shape, hair-texture, 
skin colour or head-shape mean anything in particularc-ftr the political strati­
fication of a society. Socially, race need not mean anything more than 
appearance. To my knowledge nobody has yet advanced any serious theory about 
the political sociology of complexion or eye-colour and the like. The Nazis, 
of course, tied certain physical characteristics to their theory of Aryan 
superiority, but their theory really concerned genetically determined moral 
character - appearance in itself was merely a (inevitable) correlate, index 
or a label. Some psychologists have produced evidence which they claim to 
reflect on differences in average intelligence between races. It seems, 
however, that the majority of their colleagues is not convinced that their 
tests are free of various kinds of bias. But, let us assume for a moment that 
such differences in average abilities do exist. The argument for a difference
1) Gabriel Almond and Robert Mundt, "Crisis, Choice and Change: Some 
Tentative Conclusions", in Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan and Robert 
Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political
Developments Boston: Little Brown, 1973.
in average also implies a spread around the average and hence an overlap in 
scores for groups. What does a different average IQ mean if, say, 30 or 40 
per cent of the 'lower* groups have scores higher than 30 or 40 percent of 
the 'higher' groups? If it is one day proved that the South East Asian 
peoples have higher average basic intellectual abilities than anyone else, 
would anyone seriously contemplate giving them more votes on the United 
Nations because of it? It is necessary to belabour these points somewhat 
simply in order to counter the surprisingly widespread notion that somehow 
race implies more 'serious* differences between peoples than culture; in 
fact the opposite is true if these criteria are viewed in their own right.
Racial differences only become important when such differences are 
associated with other differences. Although this remark is fairly obvious, 
it is necessary for completeness, perhaps, to list these other, intrinsically 
more meaningful dimensions of differentiation: power, economic privilege,
social status or honour, culture, including language and religion and 
'identity'. Particularly the last factor requires elaboration, and will be 
discussed more in due course. Racial differences, when associated with any 
one or several of such other factors become the more convenient labels, because 
of their ready visibility. Race as a social label means a great deal more 
than it really is. More importantly, however, racial divisions are rigid 
when physical differences are clear-cut, and hence once race becomes the label 
for power or culture, the pattern or system of differentiation in a society will 
tend to become more resistant to change. If popular politics has defined 
the system of differentiation in terms of race, that differentiation will lave 
acquired a nature significantly different to one in which race has no part.
Race, as I see it then, is a curiously ambiguous factor in politics. 
While in itself it means virtually nothing, once a meaning is imposed on it, 
it can become more powerful than all other dimensions of differentiation.
Race is a social construction only, but where its social meaning exists, it 
becomes (with apologies to chemistry) a catalyst in a mix of other factors 
and a solidifying agent.
This ambiguity of race leads to surprisingly contrasting social 
outcomes. Egypt or Algeria for example, are almost as racially heterogeneous 
as South Africa or the Sudan; yet the former societies are not even commonly 
recognised as multi-racial whereas in the latter race (in coincidence with 
other differences) has dominated their internal politics.
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II. I have suggested then, that race as a factor of differentiation may
be of a different order to the other major courses of socio-political 
division found in society. I will argue later that, in a sense, it is what 
race does not mean that makes it so problematic. Firstly, however, it might 
be useful to consider some of the critical features of the other divisive 
factors in order to help clarify the role of race in some societies.
Power is a very salient factor in its own right. Recently with so 
much emphasis being placed by critical sociologists on economic determinants 
of social structure and behaviour, power has perhaps not been accorded 
sufficient attention in analyses of divided societies. The motive of power 
and the desire on the part of people to be associated with power has a 
double basis. As a means of influencing or coercing other individuals or 
groups to behave in certain ways, power, obviously, is the means to many 
political ends —  privilege, security, status, preferred life-styles and many 
other rewards. Power cannot be simply reduced to or equated with these other 
goals. It contains a component, even if it is only a residue, of its own 
reward. It is ego-expanding and role-enriching —  in other words it provides 
the holders of power with a clear sense of efficacy and potency, and earns 
deference. Cynical as it may sound, the 'big frog in the pond' motive simply 
cannot be minimised. But, it is a morally suspect motive and hence everyone 
will deny it and look for convenient reasons for calling it something else.
It has been called public service, civic duty, divine mission, and even the 
'call' to leadership. Above all it is one of the roots of competitiveness, a 
basic motive for organisation and a means of rewarding followers, not only by 
patronage but also by bestowing the delights of reflected glory. Power must 
seek an arena, a team, an army, a faction, or a social category in order to 
realise and articulate itself and to promote itself within the political 
'marketplace'. Where racial differences exist, virtually meaningless in them­
selves, but glaringly visible and clear-cut, they can come to represent the 
defining characteristics of power or powerlessness. Race acquires a social 
potency well above its intrinsic measure. As said before while power-motives 
are difficult to justify within a modern framework of political norms and 
ideals, racial categories have tended to be self-legitimating at a very basic 
level. Even within a framework of anti-racist norms, where race differen­
tiation is socially manifest, it is seldom denied or overlooked by the 
society. In post-’civil rights' United States, for example, established 
institutions may be combating discrimination and prejudice but race, simply 
as a label —  a social category —  without any necessary implications one way
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or the other, persists. This issue requires further attention and I will 
raise it again in due course.
Everything that I have said about power in relation to race can be 
said about economic privilege, and about social status and prestige. These 
motives too —  although all-pervasive and obvious as the basis for social­
ordering within all complex societies, are seldom advertised as goals and 
motives within modern political cultures, except by those classes or status- 
groups that consider themselves to be deprived of these rewards or at a 
relative disadvantage. Where these distinctions coincide with racial 
categories, race becomes the label. One of two processes or both simul­
taneously can occur. Either the presence of co-incidental race distinctions 
can facilitate the maintenance of privilege or status in the advantaged group 
and/or race itself becomes imbued with 'hard'interests and is then perpetuated 
as the criterion according to which privilege and status is allocated.
One of the reasons why class-confrontation has been avoided in 
many industrialising states is because growth has allowed class and status 
movement, thereby softening the social meanings associated with class. Where 
class and race intertwine, mobility becomes relatively more problematic 
because of the physical visibility of race, and the ’class society' can 
become very much more rigid.
Traditions, customs, language and religion are factors in social 
differentiation which differ significantly from power, privilege and status 
in at least two respects. Firstly, they do not, by definition, imply social 
inequality. They can be appreciated or practised in private, non-political 
spheres and hence need not detract from one another. Theoretically they 
need not form part of any zero-sum social equation and can all add to the 
’social cake’. They need not cause antagonism, therefore, or even be a basis 
for political mobilisation. Some customs may be seen to impose social costs 
or have a nuisance-value, but then motorcyclists,.the owners of barking dogs, 
or smokers, etc. are not discriminated against as groups and have not yet 
formed minority parties. Intrinsically, customs, culture and religion are 
factors of social differentiation not inequality.
Secondly, unlike the inequality factors, culture and religion are 
openly acknowledged as values and frequently earn respect from out-groups.
They need not be hidden political agendas. The constitutional proposals 
of the Progressive Federal Party in South Africa, for example, takes both
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these propositions very seriously and formally accepts cultural differences 
as valued and legitimate ’private* social differentiators but without impli­
cations of inequality or need for formalised separation.
Unfortunately, however, language, religion and custom are frequently
less-benign. Lijphart, in a rigorous analysis of determinants of voting
behaviour of the ’crucial experiment' type in four political systems where
class, religion and language differences co-exist, concludes: ’it may be
likened to a decisive trial of strength in which religion turns out to be
victorious, language is a strong runner-up, and class finishes as a distant
2 )third". Even in modern, formally secular class societies, religion and 
language differences have been and are at the very least the focus of political 
competition, not only as a surrogate for class but as Lijphart shows, super­
seding class in political strength.
Where religion or language or custom and culture coincide with 
visible distinctions of race, the resultant compound effect appears to beV
very powerful indeed. But the interesting question here is why religion and 
language, which are theoretically non-antagonistic divisions, can produce such 
powerful conflicts and such coherent political mobilisation. I find this 
question doubly interesting because it bears upon the critical question one 
must ask about race. Why, when race is socially a meaningless matter of 
appearance, does it become so potent a divisive factor when ’activated’ by 
other factors of differentiation with which it coincides?
III. Identity: This problematic concept seems to hold some clues to
the two questions posed above. Perhaps the most neglected basic influence on 
political behaviour of all, the motivations surrounding the concept of identity 
are at one and the same time both self-evident and elusive. Many sociologists 
and political scientists feel uneasy about the concept because it smacks of 
the reduction of analysis to social psychology. Marxists would perhaps relegate 
it to that intellectual refuse dump of awkward and difficult-to-explain concepts 
called 'false consciousness'. It is a supremely irrational kind of need and 
seems to call into question or complicate so many of the oversimple basic 
images of man that abound in contemporary social science. It is not really com­
patible with notions of man as being materialistic and reward-maximising or
2) Arend Lijphart, "Religious vs. Linguistic vs Class Voting: The ’Crucial
Experiment' of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland",
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, June, 1979, pp. 442-4-58.
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co-operative, collective and fellow-man oriented or self-actualising and 
transcendent. Because ®f its neglected status a few very simple basic pro­
positions regarding identity are called for.
Every conscious human being must have some sort of self-concept.
We know that it is possible, among mystics and saints, to have a self-concept 
which is self-negating or self-transcending. Human beings form initial and 
basic self-concepts as children, however, when abstract or highly indirect 
reasoning is impossible. There will always be a tendency therefore for the 
typical ordinary person to emerge as an adult with a self-concept which is 
self-conscious and ego-centred. Ego maintenace and, if possible, ego-expansion 
are pervasive and inevitable needs. However subtle its manifestation, social 
needs must reflect the need among people in society for personally adequate 
or expanding self-evaluation (societies in situations of dire physical survival 
anxiety or abject poverty may represent instances where these needs are 
temporarilly suspended). While there may be many ways of achieving adequate 
self-definition and hence personal dignity, only a few people have the privi­
lege of achievement-based self-actualisation. For most people among the world’s 
populations, denied opportunities for education, self-.'mprovement and creative 
or aesthetic pursuits, identity becomes very substantially a matter of reference 
group affiliation. ’My family’, 'my lineage', 'my kin', 'my team', 'my 
neighbourhood' are important localised foundations of identity; 'my culture',
'my religion', 'my nation' and 'my race' the more general. Personal feelings 
of dignity expand with the status of the group, and status is usually 
relative to other groups. Invidious social ranking is fairly inevitable, and 
substantial proportions of people everywhere have a personal stake in their 
groups being better, stronger, cleverer, nobler than others, or if that is 
manifestly impossible, the group must at least be seen as special in some way.
It is undoubtedly theoretically possible that highly positive cri­
teria like love, generosity, humility become benchmarks of group identity. 
Remember the small child however, whose task of establishing some inchoate 
identity is made much easier by the psychologically convenient method of 
invidious comparison with peers. While anything is possible for mankind, 
the most 'economical' or straightforward way of self and group evaluation 
is social ranking. (My own feeling is that Sociology's greatest tasks and 
challenges lie in this area of study.)
Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils, refer to the root-springs of ethnic
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group feeling as the ’primordial' factor. Geertz extending his notion of 
the primordial factor to the political realm points out that after the 
establishment of nation states, "citizenship became the most broadly ne-
4) 5)
gotiable claim to personal significance ..." Benjamin Akzin, and many 
others, see personal investment in group affiliation as inevitable conditions, 
not caused only by the effects of social structure, mode of production or 
political organisation, but more basically a consequence of very typical 
and pervasive ego-needs —  human weakness, if you like. Without deep ’inner' 
resources, the development of which on a mass scale would be utopian in 
extreme, identity must surely to some extent or another be sought in group 
i dent i f i cat ion.
Identity and self-image do not prescribe social forms; they are 
shared needs which fill social vessels. The vessel can be status honour, 
cultural group, power, privilege, lifestyle or race. Race, however, has a 
particular attraction as a focus of identity in multi-racial situations, 
simply because it denotes appearance —  body image. One of the most intimate 
aspects of identity is body image, however unconscious, and peoples of con­
trasting colours can experience inarticulate feelings of quite irrational 
mutual polarisation because of this.
IV. This has been a long digression into very basic concepts but
necessary in order to suggest the following propositions:
1) Race as a factor in political divisions has no substantive determining 
content in its own right. If race has no social recognition in a society 
it will remain totally irrelevant (as would be the case in some East 
European societies where caucusoid and people of mixed mongoloid ancestry 
are largely oblivious of their differences).
2) Where race has become a criterion of social classification, however 
subtly or informally, various extrinsic meanings can (usually do) become 
imposed on it. Because it relates to physical appearance it is a possible
3) Clifford Geertz, "Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States" in Geertz (Ed.), Old Societies ccnd New Statess London: Collier 
MacMillan, 1963.
4) Ibids p.108.




focus of powerful primordial identity needs. Once racial group identifica­
tion is established other social meanings accrete to it, namely status, 
social honour, privilege and power.
3) Where race is accompanied by cultural particularities (as is so often 
the case) cultural differences, which theoretically are not the basis for 
antagonism, become the most plausible rationalisation or legitimation of 
racial inequalities.
4) Where racial and cultural differences coincide, with or without other 
aggravating features, the manifest physical reality of racial differences 
imparts a rigidity to the structure of differentiation, and this rigidity 
can be plausibly legitimated by those in superior positions by referring 
to the commonly accepted values of cultural integrity.
5) Hence race, from being a feature of no substance, through its properties 
as a social catalyst and visible, facile social label, emerges in history
as perhaps the most powerful divisive factor of all.
6) The implications of race for society at the political level are likely 
to be very different depending on the degree of race crystallisation, the 
extent to which racial categories are distinct, clearly bounded and un­
ambiguous in terms of social criteria. If a soceity has a continuum of 
pigmentation, with a large number of slight differences in racial appearance, 
like Caribbean societies, Brazil, India or Portugal, colour may become 
associated with prestige and status but it is unlikely that any major 
political groupings will be based on race. Where some major historical 
event like invasion and conquest, colonisation, or the importation of slaves 
brings two or three clearly distinctive groups into contact and where a 
group with the power to determine social norms perceives itself as distinctive 
then major political consequences can follow.
7) Where the racial groups in a society are in substantial numerical im­
balance and the category of lower political and social status is a small 
minority then political consequences are likely to be very different from 
those in a situation where there is greater numerical equality or when the 
higher status group is a minority. When the 'excluded' group could dominate 
politics or hold a permanent balance of power, the implications are obviously 
very different from the more common problem of racial minorities in otherwise 
homogeneous societies.
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V. Much of the popular wisdom concerning the race societies is that
non-racial democracy would be possible were it not for the racist motivations 
and fearfulness, material selfishness and/or power hunger of the white 
minorities. While these types of diagnoses of white motives may be more or 
less appropriate, the issue of democracy is not quite so simple. Democracy 
is a relatively rare political form in the world, although it is a well-nigh 
universal value. The lip-service that is so commonly paid to it obscures 
the fact that it is a very delicate political plant indeed. Very broadly, 
the maintenance of liberal democracy in a unitary state in which there is 
majority rule of the 'winner-take-all' kind seems to require many, if not 
most of the following societal features:
- broad consensus among all significant groups regarding national 
values, symbols and goals;
- an overarching sense of common national identity and loyalty - 
implying a relatively homogeneous society;
- material interests for which there is some prospect of 
realisation within the system as it exists;
- political party-affiliation which is reasonably fluid so that 
parties can compete effectively for support; hence,
- prospects of alteration of power between parties;
- opposition parties which have sufficient support among powerful 
groups so as to be taken seriously and consulted on important 
national issues;
- participation by the populace in the political process as indi­
viduals or as members of interest-groups and not rigidly as 
members of sub-nations, races or ethnic factions - hence 
solidarity and exclusiveness are destructive in a democracy;
- some perceived prospects of upward social mobility for all 
individuals and prospects for voluntary or achieved membership 
of privileged classes and interest groupings;
- lines of separation (cleavage) which cut across one another 
rather than lines of separation which coincide and reinforce
one another (e.g., many rich catholics, and many poor protestants 
in a situation where there is both religious and class cleavage);
- a line-up of major political parties which are all basically 
opposed to radical changes in the system, whatever the rhetoric - 
inter-party conflict can become sufficiently ruthless to 
sacrifice democratic principles if the basic social order is at 
stake;
- institutions for the resolution of conflict which largely adhere
to the principles of compromise and negotiation;
- a well-developed network of voluntary and semi-formal organisa­
tions in the society which are fairly independent of government 
and which command influential support. This organisational 
infrastructure can sanction government action and discourage 
excesses of power; this would include
- an independent judiciary and a legal system which has access 
to the consequences of state action;
- no substantial pool of severe relative deprivation, hence no 
requirement on the state to contain or suppress fervent political 
discontent, thereby avoiding the need for authoritarian main­
tenance of social order;
- an independent, critical and confident intellectual elite with 
non-conformist views and substantial status;
- a history of non-conformist religious movements among respectable 
echelons of society.
Societies which have achieved these kinds of basic requirements 
have generally undergone a gradual historical process of social differentia­
tion and reform, accompanied by expanding affluence and the piecemeal 
resolution of social conflict. Constitutions and good intentions alone 
cannot bring about democracy. If democracy has failed in so many parts of 
the Third World it is not because its politicians are any more corruptible 
than those of the industrialised West; they have, among other things, been 
much less-constrained by social forces and freer to implement arbitrary 
policies and pursue ideosyncratic or dictatorial whims. One-party demo- 
cracies which abound in the Third World attempt to preserve some democratic 
procedures by having the single party define and limit the issues of conflict 
to those which will not threaten the social order. However, they all too 
easily fall into the trap of equating the social order with the interests 
of the party elites.
Consociational theorists like Lijphart, Daalder, Rose, Hanf, McRae,
6 )Lehmbruch and many others ''suggest in their analyses that not all
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6) For an excellent discussion of these views see Arend Lijphart, Democracy 
in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1977, and Theodor Hanf et.al.3 Sildafrika: 
Friedlicher Wandel? Mttnchen/Mainz: Kaiser-Grunewald, 1978, Chapters
1, 12 and 13.
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the preconditions of the type mentioned above need be present if competitive 
democracy is preceded by a period of elite-accommodation or consociationalism.
Culturally cleaved or ’plural' societies need not be characterised 
by disruptive inter-group conflict and authoritarian rule if the legitimate 
leaders of the different ethnic segments participate in an 'elite cartel' in 
a spirit of constructive compromise, so laying the policy foundations for the 
eventual emergence of a balanced and politically integrated society. In this 
kind of consociational transition, reforms and social differentiation can 
take place which will introduce politically relevant conflicts of interest 
within ethnic segments to balance the inter-ethnic conflict.
7)Lijphart suggests that the constitutional arrangements appropriate 
to this period of coalition of compromise would include:
- mutual veto-rights for major ethnic groups;
- proportionality in representation at all levels of government 
and in the civil service, armed forces etc;
- the over-representation of significant and sensitive minorities, 
and;
the encouragement of as much autonomy for the ethnic segments as 
possible, definitely including control over internal group affairs.
If features such as these are not too rigidly entrenched the re­
sultant system will stand a good chance of warding off threats to stability, 
and to ethnic group interests and allow for a transition away from 
ethnicism as tensions and group-identities soften. The essential idea is 
that the checks and balances on government which are in a sense organic in 
a developed and differentiated modern ethnically homogeneous society are 
deliberately erected in a consociational system by elite agreement. Con­
sociationalism is not a pretty arrangement and is universally spurned by 
idealists who believe in the rapid emergence of 'brotherhood* if economic 
and social structures change. Consociationalism, as Lijphart puts it, is 
negative rather than positive peace, co-existence rather than brotherhood.
I will argue presently for the appropriateness to race societies
7) See also Arend Lijphart, "Majority rule versus Democracy in Deeply 
Divided Societies". Politikon3 Vol. 4, 1977, pp. 113-126.
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of some aspects of the type of consociational arrangement described above, 
but before that some words of caution. Lijphart sees some societies as 
too deeply divided and inappropriately structured for even consociational- 
ism to work adequately. Consociationalism may require:
a multiple balance of power in which no single group has 
overriding potential political strength;
- considerable talent in relation to the size and complexity 
of the society;
- perceptions of common dangers; 
some society-wide loyalties;
- no extreme socio-economic unequalities;
- prior traditions of compromise and accommodation; and
- a natural or existing economic and geographic separation of 
groups.
VI. What political structures are appropriate for our crystallised
race societies? Is consociationalism the answer, at least as a form of 
transition? Elsewhere I have raised serious questions about this, 'but 
I will briefly summarise my doubts as follows. Firstly, we must consider 
that where the basic and most fundamental cleavage is race there is unlikely 
to be a multiple balance of power, unless the society is fortunate enough 
to have equal proportions. Above all we must consider that whereas ethnic 
groups contain often large proportions of people who are only mildly'ethnic' 
or indifferent in their feelings, race is an identity which is assumed 
willy-nilly. If mobilisation is on the basis of race then the stark numbers 
game must be taken very seriously, at least in potential terms.
Secondly, a multi-racial society is not likely to have regionally 
separated groups - the type of society we have in mind is typically 
racially ’layered', with considerable economic integration. Hence percep­
tions of relative deprivation and invidious comparisons are likely to be 
more intense than those in regionalised plural societies. South Africa's 
urban areas and the so-called problem of the ’urban’ African is a case in 
point.
8) L. Schlemmer,"Social Implications of Constitutional Alternatives in 
South Africa", in John A. Benyon (Ed.), Constitutional Change in South 
Africa. Natal University Press, Pietermaritzburg, pp. 258-275.
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Thirdly, regarding the need for a spirit of compromise, we must
9)
consider, as Van Zyl Slabbert has argued, that racial categories do not 
encourage compromise, particularly when the consciousness has crystallised 
into Black Consciousness ./: Power versus white survival. It is very diffi­
cult to negotiate around blackness and whiteness unless one is negotiating 
for radical partition. Racial antagonisms, as I have argued in my earlier 
remarks, are certainly not the least bitter and polarising of social 
categories. Not only the issue of a spirit of compromise is problematic 
but that of some shared loyalties as well. Race societies are societies 
of enforced segregation, whether formal or informal, and common loyalties 
are tenuous under a system which is so mutually alienating for the groups 
involved.
As I have already alluded, however, perhaps the most negative 
factor of all as regards the prospects for compromise of the consociational 
type lies in what race is not. In cases where political conflict is rooted 
in cultural, religious or language differences, a political accommodation 
based on the reality of those groupings stands a good chance of being seen 
as a legitimate arrangement, in essence. The one religious, cultural or 
language group might at least understand the other groups desire for 
autonomy, self-determination, group representation or whatever form of 
group-based participation in politics is proposed. Race, however, does 
not have the same legitimacy, and the motives of the race-group desiring 
a form of dispensation based on racial categories will tend to be seen as 
simply * racist’.
Even if one group has defined the group differentiation as 
’cultural' the other groups will still be likely to reject whatever arrange­
ments are made for group representation as disguised racism. These diffi­
culties arise fundamentally because race is a social construction with no 
intrinsic validity; its relevance exists only for those who perceive it as 
important. If differences in privilege exist, the problem is compounded. 
Only the group with something to lose will see any worth in a political 
dispensation based on racial categories. Racial identity is rewarding and 
ego-expanding only for those who occupy the superior racial status in the 
society. For the rest it is a symbol of victimisation.
9) Sociologist and leader of the white opposition in South Africa.
\ ©  (: kf \
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Over the past decade-and-a-half, in the United States, South 
Africa and elsewhere blacks suffering the psychological consequences of 
discrimination have espoused various forms of ’Black Consciousness* , and 
some people might argue that this might provide a basis for constructive 
inter-group negotiation or for a group-based political participation.
This seems to be a dubious hope, however. In the U.S.A. Black Consciousness 
has in part taken the form of what strikes me as a contrived revival of a 
synthetic pre-slavery Africanist culture, which is not likely to succeed 
in engendering the same sort of positive in-group identification as that 
experienced by immigrant minorities. In South Africa, where attempts have 
been made for a long time by the black intelligentsia to distantiate 
themselves from African ’tribal’ culture, Black Consciousness is quite 
evidently a group-based spirit of protest and resistance. Attempts to 
formulate some form of pan-Africanist cultural expression seem to me to be 
shallow and unconvincing for the proponents themselves. It is liberation 
ideology and not culture. It is a positive racial identity only for as 
long as racial protest and resistance is necessary. (This is not to say 
that Black Consciousness has not brought great benefits to blacks in their 
attempts to interact with whites with dignity and self-confidence.)
Race differentiation in the race-societies under discussion has 
persisted despite widespread Westernisation and cultural change on the part 
of blacks. No one can expect the urban black political intelligentsia 
to want political arrangements which will entrench a race-caste identity 
which has always been its greatest source of woe. South Africa, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia have black ethnic groups, to be sure, but the 
essential conflict has not been between ethnics with white skins and 
ethnics with black skins —  it has been between a multi-ethnic white 
stratum and a multi-ethnic ’non-white’ stratum. Defining the political 
conflict primarilly in ethnic terms in Southern Africa is to accept shallow 
political rationalisations.
The race-societies of Southern Africa, then, do not appear to 
conform to some of the most significant requirements for successful con- 
sociationalism. Yet, racial identity remains highly salient for the 
powerful white minorities which have enormous power to resist ahý'.-dhange 
which holds severe threats to their interests; indeed, in South Africa 
they have the power to resist such change for a long time to come and quite 
possibly to disrupt the society totally. Meaningful political change 
is vitally necessary. For reasons outlined earlier, however, both 
Westminster-type majority rule democracy and consociationalism appear to be
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counter-indicated in the short to medium term. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is under­
going a coerced change as a result of war and is not a model for the other 
societies particularly in view of the greater relative strength of the white 
minority in South Africa.
VI. Political solutions are not achieved only by constitutional proposals
planned social change can also be essential in creating the basis for the 
successful adoption of constitutional arrangements. The analysis I have 
attempted thus far strongly suggests the need for strategic planned change.
In South Africa, for example, virtually no conceivable constitutional 
arrangement appears to be likely to gain acceptance among both whites and 
blacks under present social conditions and the government would be well- 
advised to implement far-reaching reforms which will result in a viable 
socio-political basis for a negotiated compromise in the fairly near future.
The reforms must include measures which will widen the scope of 
shared interests across all race groups and encourage society wide loyalties 
to the system, and above all, cross-cutting lines of differentiation, like: 
rapid improvements in education for blacks, including specialised 
'crash-programmes' which will facilitate upward occupational 
movement for blacks. A high standard of education in a society 
is not only one important precondition for the successful im­
plementation of democracy, but occupational mobility will reduce 
the co-incidence between colour and privilege, and in so doing 
weaken race polarisation;
breaking down the stark segregation of racial communities by 
allowing mixed occupation of certain residential areas, on a con­
trolled basis if deemed necessary. One is mindful of the fact 
that whites are highly-resistant to residential integration and 
that no government at this stage can afford to abandon the so-called 
Group Areas policy, but the carefully planned introduction of 
'common areas' to complement group areas will allow voluntary 
desegregation and weaken racial polarisation;
the introduction of full, representative government at the local 
authority level, with proportional representation in order to 
generate as much of a variety of leadership talent as possible and 
to mobilise the political energies of the-relatively moderate 
rank-and-file blacks; (In a situation of what one may term 'race- 
protest' and lack of representative government, spokesmen for the 
.disadvantaged groups would seem to be more, militant than,their 
average rank-and-fiie" supporter. ) •
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decentralisation of as much administrative authority as is con­
sistent with the maintenance of order, for all groups; 
the encouragement of cross-racial regional planning and policy­
making bodies which will encompass local authorities for different 
races-on largely equal terms;
a general shift to proportionality as a basis for all elections; 
non-racial elections for an upper-house or Senate but with the 
proviso that some fixed minimum proportion of support from all race 
groups is necessary for election.
The co-optation of blacks into positions of high authority would 
provide a powerful demonstration to the whole population, black and white, 
of the potential viability of joint rule without the domination of one group 
by another. I would suggest for South Africa, for example, that long drawn- 
out and cautious attempts at constitutional reform within the existing 
formal racial framework are dangerously counter-productive. They are per­
ceived by black and Coloured opinion-leaders as attempts to sugar the pill 
of Apartheid. The more complex the proposals the more suspicion they arouse, 
as long as they are based on race. How much simpler and less alienating 
would it not be to appoint a number of 'non-whites’ as assistant or deputy 
Cabinet Ministers, albeit in a special sort of capacity. In effect this type 
of 'joint Cabinet' is what the constitutional reforms are likely to lead to 
in any case, but along a much more dangerous path.
These are the kind of reforms and procedures which are essential to 
create the kind of climate in which consociationalism could succeed. They 
are not sufficient, however, simply because the greatest impediment of all in 
this type of society is the racial imbalance in numbers and the definition 
of the situation in terms of race, all rhetoric and denials notwithstanding. 
In Zimbabwe and Namibia the white minorities will ultimately capitulate to 
the majority in the face of international and military pressures. As I have 
said, in South Africa, the capacity of white power to coerce and retaliate 
is so great that an ’organic', internal solution has to be found to the 
problem of racial imbalance. This is where constitutional changes of a 
geo-political kind are essential.
One must assume that not all the 'homelands' will take independence 
(KwaZulu, the largest, is firmly resistant) and that Africans in 'white' 
urban areas will have to be granted security of status in the common area 
(government spokesmen have already accepted this principle). The numbers 
problem can then only be resolved by the creation of 'provinces' or 'states'
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in a Federal system, with states having considerable autonomy and dispro- 
portional or equal representation in the central federal government. The 
only way that this kind of arrangement (which is clearly a manipulation of 
the situation) could win approval in the appropriate quarters among blacks 
and the international community, however, would be if race were to be entirely 
abandoned as a criterion for political participation within such states —  
the franchise should be extended to all within the framework of states or 
provinces. (It is this approach of abandoning race and establishing regionalism 
as the basis for safeguarding the political intersts of minorities that 
makes the Progressive Federal Party's constitutional proposals the only 
programme for peaceful and orderly change with any longer-term prospect of 
winning support on both sides of the racial divide. In my academic role I 
bear no particular brief for this Party, but other proposals and popular 
viewpoints, both to the left and right of the Progressive Federal Party plan 
are strikingly unconstructive about the racial issue. Some simply condemn 
racial interests, others, either covertly or openly, propose confronting it 
violently, while among whites racial interests are either accommodated as 
such or obscured by rationalisations about culture or civilisation, making 
it impossible for Westernised and urbanised blacks to take the proposals 
seriously.)
One final point concerning South Africa is that the use of ethnicity 
and culture to justify racial interests has completely obscured the relevance 
of ethnicity. Among Afrikaners it would seem that interests are perceived 
much more in racial terms than in terms of Afrikaans cultural survival.
Blacks very understandably play down ethnicity because they suffer political 
and economic disadvantages as races, not as language or ethnic groups.
Although dormant, ethnicity is potentially a very salient factor, as lessons 
elsewhere have taught us. My earlier analysis would suggest that ethnicity, 
although highly dangerous, is a more viable basis for political negotiation 
and accommodation in a divided society than is race. Therefore, where 
racial distinctions are in part a matter of ethnicity, as in South Africa, an 
intelligent policy would be to cease using ethnicity as a catch-all 
political rationalisation for race and privilege and develop it in terms 
of its own merits. This might reduce the salience of race, which would be 
all to the good. For example, in South Africa language-interests are very
10) L. Schlemmer (1978): "White Voters and Change in South Africa:
Constraints and Opportunities." Optima V.27 (M-) pp. 62-83.
important. It would be appropriate for any ultimate political dispensation 
to involve representation of language groups per se in some central legis­
lature. A start should be made in this direction immediately, however 
nominally, perhaps by expanding the Senate to include nominated representa­
tives. The representatives should be chosen on a non-racial basis however, 
to break the connection between ethnicity and race. One Afrikaans representa­
tive should be Coloured and one English-language representative should be 
African or Indian. There also should be representatives of the major 
African language-groups and the two major Indian religious groups.
In concluding I will restate my major point: race, because it has
no essential socio-political implications in its own right, functions in a 
soceity with meanings acquired from various other divisions and interests, 
comes to stand for these other divisions and then creates rigidity and 
polarisation. Not having any meaning in its own right, it cannot form the 
basis for a roup-based political compromise in a divided society —  it will 
always be espoused by one group and rejected by the other. The race 
societies of Southern Africa have ’legitimate’ ethnic divisions and structural 
characteristics which make Westminster-style democracy problematic and which 
call for a consociational or federal political system, at least during a 
period of transition while the societies develop integrating characteristics. 
(This is obviously purely theoretical as regards Zimbabwe now.) This, 
however, will only be possible if race is eliminated systematically as the 
basis of social and political organisation. In South Africa, unless this 
happens, no political compromise at all will be possible.
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